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Abstract 
Much literature exists about knowledge transfer in general, but very little deals with the link 
between the micro-perspective of learning in organizations and structural, cultural, and cogni-
tive constraints caused by the organization - particularly with regard to prerequisites of 
knowledge-transfer within groups in knowledge-based working processes. The main question 
of this article is: How can knowledge transfer be supported? We exemplify this theoretical 
question with the help of an investigation we accomplished in German hospitals. The aim of 
our article is to fill two detected gaps in the existing literature: First we analyze knowledge 
transfer as a double-sided process of providing and obtaining knowledge. Second we link 
structural, cultural, and cognitive perspectives together and give a theoretical underpinning of 
knowledge transfer. We will give empirical evidence from our survey which supports five of 
our six hypotheses: Possibilities of interaction, organizational culture, and intrinsic motivation 
are relevant requirements for knowledge transfer. Only team size is not a significant factor for 
transferring knowledge in hospitals. In detail we show in this article that different factors sup-
port providing or obtaining knowledge. 
 
Keywords: knowledge transfer, knowledge management, collective action, organizational 
culture 
I. Introduction1 
Modern organizations can not produce goods or services without knowledge. Therefore 
knowledge must be transferred between employees as owners of the knowledge. In this article 
we analyse a specific type of organization, hospitals. Our main question asks how knowledge 
transfer can be supported in hospitals. Much literature exists about knowledge transfer, but 
there are two gaps: 
1. Knowledge transfer is analysed only as a process in which Ego provides knowledge to 
Alter. But no literature reflects the reverse process of obtaining knowledge. We fill the 
                                                 
1  The authors are grateful for comments on previous drafts of this paper offered by Michael Mulcahy, A. 
Georges L. Romme, Antoinette Weibel and Kimberly Harpole. 
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gap by taking both sides of knowledge transfer into account: providing and obtaining 
knowledge. 
2. Many studies about knowledge transfer exist concerning the structural factors, but the 
cognitive and cultural factors of learning in organizations via knowledge transfer has 
received less attention, and virtually no research has examined the integrative perspec-
tive. To investigate knowledge transfer in this kind of context we will link structural, 
cultural, and cognitive perspectives together.  
Argote and Ophir (2002) summarize that “research on knowledge transfer is more balanced 
across the components of organizations than on knowledge creation or retention. We see this 
as a positive feature and encourage more research on how all of the components of organiza-
tions affect knowledge transfer” (Argote and Ophir 2002: 195). Plenty of research has been 
done on that topic. The aim of our study is to fill the gap Argote and Ophir identified: We will 
show the structural, cultural, and cognitive constraints under which actors change their 
choices from a free rider position to a cooperative position, and transfer their knowledge. 
Therefore, we will discuss the behaviour of organizational actors as behaviour and choices 
under constraints. From the individual point of view, knowledge transfer is not the most fa-
voured choice, but under structural, cultural, and cognitive constraints, knowledge transfer 
becomes the most preferred choice.  
Before answering the main question knowledge transfer must be defined. Then we review 
prerequisites of knowledge transfer that have been identified by previous research. Next, we 
analyze knowledge transfer as collective action. With this theoretical underpinning, we de-
velop hypotheses regarding requirements for knowledge transfer. We then evaluate these hy-
potheses using empirical evidence from our research project concerning prerequisites for 
knowledge transfer between and within different occupational groups in hierarchical organi-
zations. Our sample contains two occupational groups: nursing staff and doctors taken from 
11 hospitals in Germany. The survey will take into account the difference of social status be-
tween doctors and nurses in Germany, which is higher than in other countries. The aim of the 
study is to differentiate the prerequisites for knowledge transfer, as a double-sided process of 
providing and obtaining knowledge, for two occupational groups, nursing staff and doctors. 
II. What is knowledge transfer? 
First we define the terms ‘knowledge’ and ‘transfer’. In the literature dealing with knowledge 
management (e.g. Willke 1998) there exists a general distinction between data (the basic ma-
terial of knowledge transfer), information (the data is placed in a reasonable context), and 
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knowledge (information is perceived in a second relation of sense, i.e. in a historical or devel-
opmental process). From this point of view the term ‘knowledge transfer’ is easily mistaken: 
Only data or information can be transferred. It is not a transfer such as when someone trans-
fers a material good. The receiver must build this information in his or her own context of his 
or her personal knowledge and through this process create new knowledge. If this is taken 
into account, knowledge transfer signifies the creation of new knowledge through exchange 
of information. Normally in the literature the term “knowledge transfer” is used, even though 
information transfer is meant. Therefore we use the term knowledge transfer too, but in the 
sense of “information transfer”. 
When we discuss knowledge transfer, we define it according to Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995). 
They understand knowledge transfer as a transfer of tacit or explicit knowledge in interaction 
between individuals (for groups cf. Hansen 1999).Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) distinguish 
between intra- and interpersonal aspects of knowledge transfer. Interpersonal aspects are so-
cialization and combination. Intrapersonal aspects such as internalization and externalization 
are not relevant for our investigation, so we focus on interpersonal aspects. Socialization is 
defined as the process that converts tacit knowledge from one person into tacit knowledge of 
another person. Combination is defined as the process of providing explicit knowledge for 
explicit knowledge. Explicit knowledge is cognitive, can be expressed in formal speech, and 
exchanged in the form of data. Tacit knowledge includes individual, context related, analo-
gous, and practice related knowledge. Tacit knowledge can only be transferred in face-to-face 
situations. In our study we investigate cases of vocational knowledge transfer in which the 
transfer is linked to human interaction that is embedded in organizational contexts. 
III. Detected prerequisites of knowledge transfer 
In recent years many assumptions about knowledge transfer have appeared in literature. Two 
points of view can be distinguished: barriers and supports of knowledge transfer. 
There are several barriers of knowledge transfer as an exchange of information: “Such ex-
change may be less effective when the source and the recipient have a difficult relationship, 
the source lacks motivation to share, the source is not perceived as reliable, the recipient lacks 
motivation to share, lacks absorptive capacity, or lacks the ability to discard old practices and 
sustain new ones, and finally, when organizational context does not provide incentive or sup-
port for the exchange” (Szulanski et al. 2002: 9). 
Knowledge transfer can be supported by individual or organizational factors. An individual 
factor is personnel movement (Gruenfeld et al. 2000, Almeida and Kogut 1999), when mem-
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bers move from one group to another it is possible that they transfer tacit as well as explicit 
knowledge (Berry and Broadbrent 1987). Not only personal but also organizational character-
istics are important for knowledge transfer (Cohen and Levinthal 1990; Szulanski 1996, 2000; 
Szulanski et al. 2002). Greve (2005), for example, assumes that knowledge transfer belongs to 
the susceptibility of the destination of the organizational unit, infectiousness of the source in 
the organizational unit, and the social proximity of the social structure between the origin and 
destination. In this regard social networks especially are important: all-channel networks lead 
to the highest performance of knowledge transfer (Shaw 1954, 1964). Hansen (1999) com-
bines network theory and the notion of complex knowledge. Weak ties between organiza-
tional units help a team searching for useful knowledge in other organizational units but im-
pede transferring complex knowledge. Knowledge transfer is greater when direct social con-
tact exists (Baum and Berta 1999). Knowledge that is embedded in routines is easier to trans-
fer than knowledge that is not codified (Argote and Darr 2000) and when the transfer is em-
bedded in experts’ work contexts (Hsiao et al. 2006). Knowledge transfer by routines must 
balance leveraging current knowledge with developing new knowledge (Collinson and Wil-
son 2006). 
As above-mentioned our study fills two gaps in the literature: the lack of analysing knowledge 
transfer as a mutual process of providing and obtaining knowledge and the integrative per-
spective of structural, cultural, and cognitive constraints which control knowledge transfer. 
However first we must develop a theoretical underpinning for knowledge transfer in order to 
generate hypotheses, especially those factor in support for knowledge transfers in organiza-
tions. 
IV. Knowledge transfer as part of knowledge management and collective 
action 
In the literature three widespread theoretical underpinnings of knowledge transfer are dis-
cussed. The typology of Schultze and Stabell (2004), Antonelli’s (2005) differentiation of 
three approaches for knowledge management, and Cabrera and Cabrera (2002; cp. Kollock 
and Smith 1996) definition of knowledge sharing as a social dilemma situation. Whereas we 
subsume sharing under transfer, because sharing is not possible without transfer. None of 
these concepts provides a usable theoretical underpinning of knowledge transfer: The first two 
are theoretical frameworks characterizing existing theories. The last one only explains provid-
ing knowledge. Knowledge transfer is a double-sided process, made up of providing and ob-
taining knowledge. From our point of view, knowledge transfer is a collective action that in-
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volves the problem of free riding. Collective action is a double-sided process and takes the 
strategy of all actors into account. Only if most employees take part in this process, knowl-
edge transfer is useful. Thus, we follow in some sense the third differentiation by Antonelli 
(2005; knowledge as a collective activity) but with the addition of technical possibilities to 
transfer knowledge and Cabrera’s and Cabrera’s definition of knowledge transfer as a social 
dilemma situation. We will define knowledge transfer as a collective action in the sense of 
Olson (1965). The requirements of knowledge transfer are best explained with the help of this 
approach. The approach is used as a heuristic device, rather than as a description of real situa-
tions. In the ‘real world’ many requirements are implemented to overcome the free riding 
situation. With the help of this approach, requirements and prerequisites can be explained in-
depth. On the one hand, knowledge transfer is a collective activity, because only a group of 
people can share something. On the other hand, transfer knowledge cannot be taken for 
granted, because a person will fear losing something (e.g. power, working time). This ap-
proach also includes a perspective which is lacking in all other literature: knowledge transfer 
must be differentiated into providing knowledge and obtaining knowledge. 
We will now examine a person in a knowledge transferring situation and his or her choices. 
V. Dilemmas of collective action in hospitals  
Why should Ego provide knowledge to his or her colleagues? He has to, because he has to 
produce a common good, the health of the patient. The health of the patient is a private good, 
both for the patient and the hospital. Therefore everyone else maybe excluded. However the 
production of this product is non-rival, which means it is only possible as a joint production 
process2. Hechter (1987) defines a private good, which can only be produced in collective 
production processes, as joint goods, or “…excludable jointly produced goods – goods whose 
attainment involves the cooperation of at least two (but usually far more) individual produc-
ers” (Hechter 1987: 10). For the production of this good, collaboration among nursing staff, 
among doctors, and between these two groups is necessary. Collaboration in this context 
means the transfer of knowledge. From the employee’s point of view knowledge is power. If I 
provide all my information to other people, I will lose power in relevant bargaining situations. 
Why should I provide my knowledge to other people? Knowledge is my power-resource. I 
thus have no interest in transferring my knowledge. I expect rewards for my willingness to 
share my knowledge. In addition, there are costs in the form of time etc. In this situation each 
                                                 
2 The characteristics of the good “health of a patient” fits not in the typology of public or club goods (Cornes 
and Sandler 1996), it is “only” a joint good that means a common produced good. 
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employee has four different choice situations depending on the number of cooperating col-
leagues (Wilkesmann and Blutner 2007): 
In the first situation Ego knows that the joint production process will work without his contri-
bution, because there are enough other employees who will contribute to the production. The 
patient will recover without knowledge provided by Ego, as a doctor, for the diagnosis, or by  
Ego as a nurse for the nursing process. In this case, Ego will choose the free rider position, 
because he can save costs (i.e. time, if he does not care about the patient).  
In the second situation Ego knows that the joint good will not be produced, because too few 
employees will participate. Ego will not collaborate, because his contribution is not necessary: 
With or without his or her contribution, in any case, it is clear that the goal of the joint pro-
duction will not be reached. In this situation, Ego can save costs if he does not participate. 
The patient will not recover, because no one is interested in this case and no one will commit 
to the knowledge transfer for the diagnosis. Ego calculates contribution as waste of time. 
In the third situation Ego does not know if the joint production will work, because only some 
employees will contribute. The employee will choose the defection strategy, because he will 
save costs in this insecure situation. 
In the fourth situation Ego recognizes that exactly one contribution for the joint good is miss-
ing. Ego’s knowledge (or the knowledge of another employee) is necessary for the achieve-
ment of the objectives. Ego will provide his knowledge, if he recognizes that exactly his 
knowledge is missing for the achievement of success. In this case the cost of his contribution 
is lower than the expected benefit. 
The dilemma in this situation is that the individual calculation does not fit with the collective 
calculation: The individual calculation is to choose the free rider position, while the collective 
perspective is to overcome the defection strategy. If all the employees are cooperating then at 
the level of the individual, cooperation is the dominant strategy. Nevertheless, if the joint 
good must be produced (the health of the patient), it is necessary to overcome the free rider 
position. Especially in the third situation, it is necessary to overcome the free rider position, if 
the hospital will produce the joint good. Now we must examine whether there are some dif-
ferences by changing the perspective: Does Ego have the same calculation for obtaining 
knowledge? 
In the first situation, when enough actors contribute, Ego will expect that he can obtain 
knowledge from colleagues, because contributing means transferring knowledge. Therefore, 
he is interested in maintaining situations in which the free rider position of his or her col-
leagues is overcome: Only when they are not free riding, can he or she obtain knowledge.  
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In the second situation Ego cannot expect that he will obtain knowledge, because of the lack 
of contribution from all of his or her colleagues. He or she will not have any illusions about 
the knowledge transfer. 
In the third situation only some of Ego’s colleagues cooperate. Ego will expect to gain some 
knowledge from others. If he wants to obtain more knowledge, he is interested in overcoming 
the free rider position of his or her colleagues in this situation. 
In the fourth situation Ego knows that all others will cooperate without him or her. Thus, he 
expects to obtain a lot of knowledge. 
For both situations, providing and obtaining knowledge, the overcoming of the free rider posi-
tion is necessary, because from the individual point of view knowledge transfer will not be 
accomplished. In this article we choose a theoretical underpinning for knowledge transfer that 
explains the situation mentioned above and in turn explains the overcoming of the free rider 
position. This requirement is fulfilled by the well known approach of Olson’s (1965) logic of 
collective action as well as the ongoing discussion and expansion of this approach. Olson’s 
solution for overcoming the free rider position is twofold:  
1. In small groups the free rider can be punished by a group member, who has to be re-
warded for that punishment by all other group members. This situation describes the sec-
ond-order-free-rider problem (Coleman 1990), which is easier to overcome than the first 
order problem. 
2. In large groups selective incentives (i.e. money, social status) prevent free riding.  
The second solution is not applicable to the knowledge transfer problem, because knowledge 
transfer cannot be monitored and rewarded. To sum up, there are at least three problems (cf. 
Weibel 2004):  
1. The main problem is that the common development of new knowledge and the trans-
fer of knowledge are not observable by a third party. If a third actor can not monitor 
the process, he will not be willing to use selective incentives to reward new knowl-
edge development and to reward the transfer of knowledge.  
2. Another problem concerns multi-tasking. When work tasks are complex, all employ-
ees must fulfill several tasks. Each selective incentive rewards only one task. A ra-
tional actor will then only accomplish that single task, all other tasks will be neglected 
(Frey and Osterloh 2002: 19). On the other hand, it is not feasible to provide selective 
incentives for every task. It would become too complex and implies that every action 
must be rewarded. 
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3. These problems can produce an expectation cycle (cf. Frey and Osterloh 2002). If I re-
ceive a reward of Z this year for knowledge transfer, I will expect a reward of Z + X 
next year. 
Subsequently we will discuss the first solution of the small group situation and present two 
other solutions, from the ongoing discussion of this approach, which can overcome the di-
lemma of knowledge transfer as collective action. All solutions have in common, that the 
choices of the actors are bounded through constraints. Constraints could be institutions 
(Greenwood and Hinings 1996) like rules and norms (Nee 1998) or cognitive schemata 
(Zucker 1977; Roberts and Greenwood 1997; Scott 2001). Institutions are constraints for the 
behaviour and choices of organizational actors. Therefore institutions coordinate action of or-
ganizational participants. Wezel and Saka-Helhout (2006) support this thesis with data from 
Major League Baseball in the period from 1920 to 2001. They are reporting about institutions 
in the organizational field. We will apply this assumption to the field of intra-organizational 
institutions. From this point of view, “Institutions, defined as webs of interrelated rules and 
norms that govern social relationships, compromise the formal and informal social constraints 
that shape the choice-set of actors. Conceived as such, institutions reduce uncertainty in hu-
man relations. They specify the limits of legitimate action in the way that the rules of a game 
specify the structure within which players are free to pursue their strategic moves using pieces 
that have specific roles and status positions” (Nee 1998: 8). 
VI. Overcoming the dilemma 
In alignment with Scott (2001) we will distinguish between three constraints: (1) structural 
constraints, (2) cultural constraints, and (3) cognitive constraints. We will assume that these 
constraints will affect the choices against free riding for both transfer relations: providing and 
obtaining knowledge. The double-sided knowledge transfer process is not defined as an ex-
change process. We do not focus on reciprocity; therefore we do not stress the following per-
spective: Only if Ego provides Alter some information, will Alter return some information. 
We stresses Ego’s point of view: He or she has to transform Alter’s information into knowl-
edge, thus only Ego can decide if Alter’s information is relevant for his or her knowledge. 
The following theoretical underpinning asks, under which constraints does Ego perceive that 
he or she will provide or obtain more or less knowledge. Therefore the hypotheses are defined 
for both sides of knowledge transfer. 
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(1) structural constraints:  
First of all, knowledge transfer requires opportunities where people can meet. Without such 
possibilities of interaction, knowledge transfer can not take place. Knowledge transfer needs 
freedom to develop interaction - without possibilities and leeway for interaction, transfer is 
not possible. Some companies create special events or places where employees can meet and 
interact, like coffee corners, social events, or meeting points. One big barrier is shortage of 
time – with a tight schedule no one will transfer knowledge, because it takes some extra time. 
This leads to the first hypothesis. 
(H1) The more possibilities that exist for interaction within organizations, the more 
knowledge can be shared. 
All the possibilities mentioned above are face-to-face interactions. If employees are not in the 
same place at the same time, knowledge transfer must be supported by computer-mediated 
interaction. There are several IT-tools on the market that support knowledge transfer within 
organizations. In this sense, computer-mediated communication increases the possibility of 
interaction, because a new channel for interaction is added. With the support of this channel 
only explicit knowledge can be transferred. Therefore hypothesis two states: 
(H2) The more computer-mediated communication is available, the easier knowledge 
transfer is. 
The most important factor for managing knowledge transfer is the size of the network or 
group (Olson 1965). If the size of the network increases, some employees can resort to an in-
dividual calculation of the kind mentioned above, and free riding will occur. In the case of a 
small network this dilemma is easy to overcome, because every peer can monitor, evaluate 
and assess the work of other peers. But monitoring and evaluating are related to a group size 
where face-to-face interaction between all peers is possible. In this case peers can punish de-
fection. Punishing peers generates costs, because it is awkward to speak with a colleague 
about his or her failures. Most people will feel psychologically stressed. The free riding di-
lemma is raised to a second level: No one will punish peers, and therefore the free rider posi-
tion at the second level is chosen (Coleman 1990). Overcoming the second-order-free-rider-
problem is easier, because it produces fewer costs than overcoming the first-order-free-rider 
problem. Only one sanctioner is needed to punish the defector. All others can reward the 
sanctioner. This is cheaper than if all members were to punish the defector (Coleman 1990). 
With group size the cost of monitoring increases (Hechter 1987). If monitoring is too costly, 
the problem of cooperation emerges. Peers can choose the free rider position when they per-
ceive that their action cannot be monitored by others (Heckathorn 1996).  
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(H3) The smaller the network or team is, the better knowledge can be transferred. 
 
(2) normative-cultural constraints: Organizations do not only persist through reward and 
punishment, but also through organizational culture, which is an important aspect. The debate 
in the 1980’s about organizational culture (e.g. Allaire and Firsirotu 1984) gains new impor-
tance in the context of knowledge transfer. If an actor commits to an organizational culture 
which involves norms for cooperation and for helping each other, knowledge transfer is more 
probable than in hierarchical cultures in which colleagues compete to win superiors’ favour. 
Therefore culture is a relevant constraint for everyone’s choices: If I commit to a norm of co-
operation, free riding will be out of range of my options.  
One of the important factors for knowledge transfer is a high care atmosphere (Zárraga and 
Bonache 2005). Free riding can be overcome by a special culture of this type. In the literature 
this topic is often emphasized but very seldom linked to empirical evidence. Ouchi (1979: 
838) for example defines in his theoretical framework culture as a constraint for social con-
trol. Therefore social agreements, shared values and beliefs are prerequisites for successful 
knowledge transfer. Zárraga and Bonache (2005: 665) define a high care atmosphere as one 
with mutual trust, active empathy, lenience in judgment, courage, and access to help. Ngoc 
(2005) also emphasizes this culture for knowledge transfer. Both last mentioned publications 
are among the few examples of empirical surveys about this topic. The items used in this sur-
vey are partly the same items Denison and Mishra (1995) primarily used in their survey. Fey 
and Denison (2000) analyse the correlation between organization culture and efficiency. Cul-
ture is defined with the factors involvement, consistency, adaptability, and mission. The in-
volvement of the organizational culture leads to the following effect: “Executives, managers, 
and employees are committed to their work and feel that they own a piece of the organization. 
People at all levels felt that they have at least some input into decisions that will affect their 
work and that their work is directly connected to the goals of the organization” (Fey and 
Denison 2000: 7). Consistency is important, because “(B)behavior is rooted in a set of core 
values, and leaders and followers are skilled at reaching agreement even when there are di-
verse points of view. This type of consistency, is a powerful source of stability and internal 
integration that results from a common mindset and a high degree of conformity” (Fey and 
Denison 2000: 7). Adaptability is the next factor of culture according to Fey and Denison: 
“Adaptable organizations are driven by their customers, take risks and learn from their mis-
takes, and have capability and experience at creating change. They are continuously changing 
the system so that they are improving the organizations’ collective abilities to provide value 
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for their customers” (Fey/Denison 2002: 7/8). Last but not least a mission is important for 
them, because organizations must be directed to organizational goals and strategic objects. 
For the topic of knowledge transfer we focus on the two aspects of involvement and consis-
tency. These are the most relevant factors for an organizational culture that supports people in 
cooperation. Involvement is operationalized in the dimensions empowerment, team orienta-
tion, and capability development. In our questionnaire we used all items for involvement, but 
in regards to the topic, team orientation is the most important factor for knowledge transfer, 
because it belongs to trust by peers. If all peers are orientated to reach a common goal, 
knowledge transfer is easy. Rather than the success of individuals, the success of teams takes 
centre stage. Team-orientation is related to common action, the joint production and both 
means of knowledge transfer. Therefore the fourth hypothesis is: 
(H4) Team-orientation is a cultural trait that will be positively related to knowledge 
transfer. 
Consistency is also an important factor for an organizational culture with successful knowl-
edge transfer. If all employees are committed to shared core values and to a clear agreement 
about the way to do things in the organization, then it is more probable that they will transfer 
knowledge. In the literature about knowledge management, this phenomenon is well known 
as a community of practice (Wenger et al. 2002). “Communities of Practice are groups of 
people who share a concern, a set of problems, or a passion about a topic, and who deepen 
their knowledge and expertise in this area by interacting on an ongoing basis” (Wenger et al. 
2002: 4). Developing new knowledge is closely related to the existence of this kind of group. 
Robertson et al. (2003) also show through two case studies that coordination of knowledge 
work at consulting companies requires the additional development of collective core values 
and agreement that are based on professionalism and elitism. Elitism is founded through a se-
lection process with high symbolic thresholds.  
(H5) Consistency or the degree of normative integration, as a cultural trait, will be 
positively related to knowledge transfer. 
A variable which moderates this relationship is organizational tenure. It is to be assumed that 
the tenure is positively correlated with normative and cultural socialization. A newcomer in 
an organization needs time to behave like a normatively integrated employee would. 
 
(3) cognitive constraints: In organization studies we can recognize a cognitive shift: Organi-
zations are analysed as rules which are rooted in cognitive taken-for-granted beliefs. All these 
phenomena are well known and have been explored in detail elsewhere (e.g. DiMaggio 1997). 
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In our study we will emphasize the cognitive constraints, because from our point of view one 
of the most important aspects of this framework is the motivation of actors. As discussed be-
fore, knowledge work cannot be managed by selective incentives, so the occurrence of intrin-
sic motivation is very important. In the absence of monitoring, intrinsic motivation is the only 
way to motivate people to transfer knowledge and to develop new knowledge together. 
Intrinsic motivation is defined by Heckhausen (1991) as follows: “Action is intrinsic if the 
means (the act) thematically corresponds to its ends (the action goal); in other words, when 
the goal is thematically identical with the action, so that it is carried out for the sake of its own 
objectives. For example, achievement behaviour is intrinsic if it is engaged in merely to ac-
complish a desired outcome, because it solves a problem or leads to a self-evaluation of com-
petence. Here, the outcome, a particular accomplishment, is not a means toward some other 
nonachievement-related end” (Heckhausen 1991: 406). 
If all group members are intrinsically motivated, the free rider problem does not appear (Frey 
and Osterloh 2002)3. While the resource expenditures, which are necessary to develop solu-
tions for the given problems, are registered as costs in the original calculation situation, they 
do not appear as costs when the actors are intrinsically motivated. Solutions are found, be-
cause to work is fun and the solution process is interesting. Therefore, an intrinsically moti-
vated actor does not deduct these expenses from his profit, but views them as an extra profit. 
As a result, the cooperation strategy becomes individually rational. Here again, the actors' 
subjective perception transforms the starting situation (Kelley and Thibaut 1978). 
Taking into consideration that intrinsic motivation is not a selective incentive, it is not possi-
ble to produce it directly. Motivation is a cognitive attribute of each participant, but as moti-
vational psychology tells us, the attribute is linked to work situation. In similar work situa-
tions, it is probable that the same attribute occurs. The only way is to arrange the structural 
prerequisites in a manner that stimulates intrinsic motivation. Research in work psychology 
finds a positive correlation between freedom of action and intrinsic motivation. Freedom of 
action is defined as work enrichment, to do a task from the beginning to the end, and to decide 
on the work schedule autonomously. In the literature two models are discussed: the Demand-
Control-Support model (Karasek 1979, for further details see Tummers et al. 2006) and the 
Job Characteristic model (Hackman and Oldham 1980). Here we use the last model, because 
it stresses the link between (perceived) work structure (and the organizational environment of 
the work structure), and cognition.  
                                                 
3 Frey and Osterloh (2002) or Weibel (2004) label that self-control. More importantly, both intrinsic motiva-
tion and self-control are describing an internal locus of control.  
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Hackman and Oldham (1980) have analysed the relationship between five core dimensions of 
the work environment and the occurrence of intrinsic motivation. The core work environment 
dimensions are skill variety, task identity, task significance, autonomy, and job feedback 
(Hackmann and Oldham 1980: 78-79). They distinguish three individual dispositions caused 
by different attribution processes: knowledge and skill, the strength of the need for growth, 
and context satisfaction. If employees have these individual dispositions and if they work in 
one of the situations defined above, it is very likely that they will develop intrinsic motiva-
tion. In the model of Hackman and Oldham (1980) context variables are very important, be-
cause the perception of a work situation is linked to the working context. One of the key con-
text factors is salary. In our sample, taken from German hospitals, the context factor of salary 
satisfaction is very important too. During our survey the biggest strike of doctors in the his-
tory of Germany took place. The doctors’ dissatisfaction with their wages was a topic of pub-
lic discussion with huge public debates about the strikes for higher wages occurring. We took 
this into account and kept an eye on the factor ‘salary satisfaction’. The five core dimensions 
are defined here as a wide scope of action. As an institution it is important that all actors as-
sume everybody else is intrinsically motivated – and that everyone takes this for granted. In 
such a work situation, everyone perceives everyone else as mutually intrinsically motivated. 
Work environment can lead to intrinsic motivation, and is in context of knowledge transfer, 
only a moderate, third variable. More relevant is the relation between intrinsic motivation and 
cooperative action. If actors are intrinsically motivated they cooperate; they share their 
knowledge because they are used to it and it is fun. They do not calculate how to derive a 
profit from the cooperation (for evidence see Wilkesmann and Rascher 2005).  
(H6) The more employees are intrinsically motivated, the more they will engage in 
knowledge transfer. 
Under the structural, cultural and cognitive constraints or frameworks outlined above, free 
riding can be overcome, and knowledge transfer is more likely to occur. Table 1 summarizes 
our definition of the requirements of knowledge transfer.  
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Table 1: Hypothesises   
Structural constraints  Normative-cultural con-
straints 
Cognitive constraints 
 
(H1) The more possibilities 
for interaction within organi-
zations that exist, the more 
knowledge can be shared. 
(H2) The more computer-
mediated communication is 
available, the easier knowl-
edge transfer is. 
(H3) The smaller the network 
or team is, the better knowl-
edge can be transferred. 
 
(H4) Team-orientation is a 
cultural trait that will be posi-
tively related to knowledge 
transfer. 
(H5) Consistency or the de-
gree of normative integration, 
as a cultural trait, will be 
positively related to knowl-
edge transfer. 
 
(H6) The more employees are 
intrinsically motivated, the 
more they will engage in 
knowledge transfer. 
 
 
 
VII. Some empirical evidence from a survey 
Sample Size 
All in all 11 hospitals took part in our survey which we conducted from February to May 
2006 in Germany. At that point in time the participating hospitals were sized between 145 – 
618 beds. In Germany it is common to differentiate between small hospitals (up to 250 bed 
capacity), medium-sized hospitals (up to 500 bed capacity) and large hospitals (more than 500 
beds capacity). Five hospitals fall into the “small” category, five hospitals fall into the “me-
dium-sized” category, and one into the “large” category. Altogether 3,024 questionnaires 
were distributed and 1,047 returned. The rate of return amounts to 34.62%. If we distinguish 
the response rate between the two occupational groups, we received 30.34% of the distributed 
questionnaires from doctors and 36.00% from the nursing staff. The dataset contents 19.4% 
questionnaires from doctors and 80.6% from nursing staff. The proportion of the two em-
ployed occupational groups in hospitals in general is equivalent to the distribution in our sur-
vey data. 975 of the 1047 returned questionnaires were usable, and were incorporated in our 
analysis. The mean age of the doctors is 40.8 years and 39.2 years in the case of the nursing 
staff. The average duration of the current organizational membership is 6.8 years for the doc-
tors and 14.4 years for the nursing staff. 55% of the responding doctors and 24.9% of the re-
sponding nurses are male. The distribution of age and sex reflects the situation of employees 
in hospitals in general. The sample is representative in this respect. 
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Measurement 
For the dependent variable we use 7 items to measure tacit or explicit forms of knowledge 
transfer. Respondents answered on a five-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = 
strongly agree). We asked if the respondents provide knowledge, as well as if they receive 
knowledge from colleagues. The items measure how and in which direction knowledge trans-
fer is accomplished (see appendix). In Nonaka and Takeuchi’s terms (1995), we only use 
items for socialization and combination as part of transferring knowledge from one person to 
another. Internalization and externalization are intrapersonal aspects of knowledge ‘transfer’.  
To reduce the items and to test if a difference in providing and obtaining knowledge can be 
found in the data, the principal components analysis is chosen. The factors are defined by a 
eigenvalue greater than one according to the Kaiser-criterion. An orthogonal rotation follow-
ing the varimax method with Kaiser-normalisation makes it easier to interpret the factors. 
With a KMO-value of 0.8 and an explained variance of 64.3% the following factors can be 
distinguished:  
The first factor describes the socialization aspect where, in situations of face-to-face interac-
tion knowledge is given from the participant to other persons. This scale (‘providing knowl-
edge’) has a high reliability with Cronbach's Alpha =.86. The second factor describes the so-
cialization aspect where in situations of face-to-face interaction the participants obtain knowl-
edge from other people (learning aspect). The scale ‘obtaining knowledge’ is highly reliable 
(alpha =.79). 
These factors show the difference in providing and obtaining knowledge. These scales are the 
constructs we wish to explain, using an OLS-regression. To this end, we construct the inde-
pendent variables, also using factor analysis, to test the above mentioned hypothesises. 
In order to operationalize our first hypothesis, we characterize the channels of social interac-
tion. Drawing on Denison and Mishra (1995) and on Ngoc (2005), we measure social interac-
tion by items they used in their questionnaires. These items are valid and are partly adapted in 
our questionnaire. A comparison of different questionnaires is discussed by Delobbe et al. 
(2002). A principal components analysis with varimax rotation could not differentiate the 
items successfully. The reasons are partly because the factors didn't differ very well, but more 
importantly because some statements of the construct were to close to our dependent variable. 
We chose four statements as examples for communication channels. Only two items produced 
significant effects and therefore are included in our model. Those two are: ‘I participate in all 
important meetings held in my hospital.’ And ‘I usually take opportunities to discuss work 
related things in my work break with colleagues.’ 
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This approach was also chosen for the second hypothesis and results in using 'use of internet' 
and 'use of databases' as indicators4 for computer-mediated communication. 
To test our third hypothesis, we controlled the size of the team, including doctors and nursing 
staff. The item for team size is: „With how many do you work together day by day (only doc-
tors and nursing stuff)?” This variable is coded 0 for teams that consist of less than nine mem-
bers and 1 for teams with nine and more members. Initial results in an earlier phase of our re-
search suggested that nine was a crucial number, especially for doctors, who acted as thresh-
old: Groups with nine or more members transferred more knowledge. These findings didn't 
hold for long, as one can see below. 
We measured the fourth hypothesis by drawing on the team orientation and involvement 
items of Denison and Mishra (1995). For the involvement dimension we used items for the 
scales: empowerment and capability development. A main component analysis with varimax 
rotation differentiates the items into three scales with a KMO-value of 0.89 and explained 
variance of 54.3%: ‘interdisciplinary team orientation’ (alpha =.71), ‘strategic capability de-
velopment’ (alpha =.8),and ‘intradisciplinary team orientation’ (alpha =.72). The scale of 
‘team orientation’ measures hypothesis 4, while the scale of ‘strategic capability develop-
ment’ describes the normative integration factor from hypothesis 5. 
To further test hypothesis 5 we also use items of Denison and Mishra (1995) for the other or-
ganization culture dimension of ‘consistency’. The ‘consistency’ dimension is measured by 
the scales of ‘core values’, ‘agreement’, and ‘coordination/integration’. A main component 
analysis differentiates the items into three scales with a very weak reliability. Therefore we 
combined the items to one scale ‘consistency’ (alpha =.83). Hypothesis 5 is thus measured by 
the scales ‘strategic capability development’ and ‘consistency’. Since these two scales were 
very highly correlated and created collinearity problems in our regression-model, we omitted 
one. This was 'strategic capability development', since the consistency scale fits the model 
better (i.e. created fewer collinearity problems with other variables). So hypothesis 5 is tested 
by the scale measuring ‘consistency’. Additionally we use organizational duration to control 
for cultural and normative socialization. We assume that knowledge transfer will increase 
with occupational duration,. 
The last Hypothesis, the impact of intrinsic motivation, is measured with five items. One of 
these items proved to be not very reliable and was therefore deleted. The intrinsic motivation 
scale was then acceptably reliable with alpha =.62. 
                                                 
4 Both were coded as follows: 0 = not using, 1 = using once a week, 2 = using thrice a week, 3 = using once a 
day, 4 = using several times per day. 
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Table 2: Descriptives 
  Cronbach's Doctors (n=192) Nurses (n=783) 
   alpha Mean Sd Mean Sd 
providing knowledge 0.86 3.75 0.95 3.68 0.82 
obtaining knowledge 0.78 3.36 0.89 3.53 0.74 
meetings  -  3.48 1.14 3.36 1.12 
breaks  -  3.61 1.10 3.31 1.07 
intradisciplinary team culture 0.72 3.29 0.76 3.47 0.67 
interdisciplinary team culture 0.71 3.70 0.82 3.75 0.79 
consistency 0.83 2.81 0.64 2.94 0.54 
intrinsic motivation 0.6 4.02 0.68 3.95 0.61 
internet use  -  1.97 1.46 0.39 0.90 
database use  -  1.80 1.33 1.39 1.25 
satisfaction with wages  -  2.14 1.17 2.29 1.04 
organizational duration  -  6.78 6.72 14.36 8.79 
  0 1 0 1 
group size (0: < 9, 1: >8)  -  32,29% 67,71% 60,79% 39,21% 
Gender (0: female, 1: male)  -  44,27% 55,73% 75,10% 24,90% 
 
Data 
We use OLS-regression analyses to test our hypotheses,. We estimate four models: Knowl-
edge provided by doctors, knowledge obtained by doctors, knowledge provided by nurses and 
knowledge obtained by nurses. Table 3 shows the results for the regression models. Effects 
shown are the standardized beta-coefficients. 
 
Table 3: Regression of providing and obtaining knowledge for doctors and nurses on structural, cultural, 
and cognitive requirements 
 Doctors Nurses 
  providing obtaining providing obtaining 
Meetings 0.125+ - 0,036 0.123** 0,047 
Breaks 0,08 0.169* 0.099** 0.11** 
internet use 0.201** 0,055 0.079* 0,008 
database use - 0,035 0.133+ 0.092** - 0,043 
group size (0: <9, 1: >8) 0,081 - 0,001 0,031 - 0,036 
intradisciplinary team culture 0.193* 0,11 0,037 0.234** 
interdisciplinary team culture 0,051 0,038 0.076+ 0,034 
Consistency - 0,011 0.188* 0.072+ 0,067 
organizational duration 0.274** - 0.131+ 0.067* - 0.086* 
intrinsic motivation 0.223** 0.157* 0.133** 0,044 
satisfaction with wages - 0.118+ - 0,090 - 0.16** 0.075* 
Gender (0: female, 1: male) 0,044 - 0,104 0.123** - 0,042 
N 192 192 783 783 
adj. r² 0.288 0.215 0.156 0.14 
** p < 0,01 * p < 0,05 + p < 0,1   
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Hypothesis 1, which states that the more possibilities of interaction exists, the more knowl-
edge can be transferred, is supported. We find positive and significant effects for both indica-
tors, meetings and breaks. A closer look reveals that both of our distinctions – doctors vs. 
nurses and obtaining vs. providing knowledge – are differently affected by the explanatory 
variables. While meetings only refer to providing knowledge, we presume that the more in-
formal kind of breaks strongly affects knowledge obtaining for doctors. For nurses meetings 
affect providing knowledge and breaks affect providing as well as obtaining. 
Hypothesis 2, more knowledge transfer with rising use of computers, shows a similar picture: 
Computer mediated communication positively affects knowledge transfer. Only obtaining 
knowledge by nurses does not show significant effects. For doctors internet use spurs knowl-
edge providing, while the use of databanks affects the obtaining of knowledge. For nursing 
staff only knowledge providing is encouraged by computer mediated communication channels 
and only to a small degree. Computer mediated communication does not seem to be very im-
portant for nurses to transfer knowledge; this is probably primarily because they still do not 
have regular access to computers (see table 2). 
Hypothesis 3, in smaller teams more knowledge is shared, is not supported by our data. The 
size of the team has no significant effect in any of our models. 
For Hypothesis 4, that team culture stimulates knowledge transfer, we find some support, but 
the term “culture” must be differentiated: ‘intradisciplinary team culture’ has strong effects on 
providing knowledge for doctors, while it strongly affects nurses in obtaining knowledge. In-
terdisciplinary team culture has virtually no effect on the transfer of knowledge: the small ef-
fect on knowledge providing for nurses is only significant at the 10% level and should be 
dismissed (with n = 783). It seems that both doctors and nurses value working with members 
of their own occupational group more highly, but to different ends. 
Hypothesis 5, with a rising level of ‘consistency’ or ‘shared organizational values’ more 
knowledge is transferred, can only partially be supported: Only for doctors a strong and sig-
nificant effect for obtaining knowledge exist. Our second independent variable, ‘organiza-
tional duration’ yields interesting results: As predicted, with longer duration, more knowledge 
is shared. This can be observed for both occupational groups, but for doctors to a much larger 
extent than for nurses. Knowledge obtaining, however, is negatively associated with the dura-
tion. The longer people work in a specific hospital the less they feel they can learn from oth-
ers. This shows the transition from learning to teaching. 
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Our findings support Hypothesis 6, that intrinsic motivation instigates knowledge transfer. 
With the exception of nurses obtaining knowledge, intrinsic motivation always shows strong 
positive effects on knowledge transfer. 
The control variable gender shows significant and strong effect on knowledge providing by 
nurses. Male nurses provide more knowledge to colleagues than female nurses. Since our the-
ory does not contain a ‘gender bias’ this should be considered when advancing the theoretical 
background. 
Satisfaction with wage deals with the context factors. The original wording of the item is: 
“I’m satisfied about the amount of pay I receive in relation to how hard I work.” Nurses and 
doctors who work more than others and are more involved in providing knowledge than oth-
ers but are less rewarded than others, are often not satisfied with their salary in relation to 
others who choose the ‘free-rider position’. This is especially true for the nurses who face 
similar conditions as the doctors but, in contrast to the doctors, do not have any real options to 
do substantially better in the future,. This situation worsened with the doctors’ strike and the 
subsequent lack of attention to the nurses’ situation. 
Discussion 
Except for hypothesis 3, our analyses provide some support for all of our hypotheses. We now 
have to ‘fine tune’ our theory to different incentives for providing and obtaining knowledge, 
for doctors as well as for nursing staff. 
The general fit of our models show that our leading assumptions – the distinctions between 
providing and obtaining knowledge and between doctors and the nursing staff – are sup-
ported. The adjusted r² is greater for doctors than for nurses and it is also greater for providing 
than for obtaining knowledge. 
The difference between doctors and nurses cannot be explained by assuming that the doctors’ 
work contains more knowledge-intensive processes than the work of nurses. Though the mod-
els for nurses do not fit the data as well as the ones for doctors, it is not only the size of the r² 
that differs. For example the intradisciplinary team culture raises knowledge obtaining for 
nurses; while for doctors it is associated within providing knowledge. 
If we go further into detail, the most important factors for doctors to provide knowledge are: 
Computer mediated communication (H2), team orientation (H4) and intrinsic motivation 
(H6). To obtain knowledge, face to face interactions (H1) are important for doctors, as well as 
shared organisational values (H5) and intrinsic motivation (H6). 
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Nursing staff transfers more knowledge if there are many communication channels, especially 
face to face and computer mediated ones (H1 + H2) and if they are intrinsically motivated 
(H6). Obtaining knowledge depends mostly on face to face communication (H1) and team 
orientation (H4) for nurses. 
This shows that, upon closer inspection, no model supports the same set of hypothesises. 
From this point, we conclude that not only do obtaining knowledge and providing knowledge 
draw on different sources but they also differ – and not only weaken – for different levels of 
knowledge intensive working processes. 
The channels which promote knowledge transfer can - at least for doctors - be relatively 
clearly distinguished: Meetings encourage providing knowledge, while communication during 
breaks is associated with obtaining knowledge. Participating in formal meetings supports 
knowledge providing, because it fits the expectation of a meeting. While more informal occa-
sions support obtaining knowledge, because often the informal context can be more easily 
adapted to individual needs. Intradisciplinary team culture positively stimulates providing 
knowledge while the level of shared organizational values has that effect on obtaining knowl-
edge. Feeling at home in a team causes doctors to provide more knowledge while feeling at 
home in the organisation as a whole makes obtaining knowledge easier. Doctors who often 
access the internet can provide more knowledge, while the use of databases increases obtain-
ing knowledge. The internet is known from experience as a sharing medium while databases 
are associated with the expectation of finding answers to pointed questions. It seems that even 
the channels of knowledge transfer are promoted either obtaining or providing knowledge. So, 
we find substantial support for our insights, namely that it is useful to distinguish in detail not 
only providing and obtaining knowledge and different levels of knowledge intensity at work, 
but also the different channels and constraints of communication. 
One major finding for the theory of collective action is the rejection for H 3: Contrary to Ol-
son’s assumption, the team size is not a significant factor for transferring knowledge in hospi-
tals.  
VIII. Conclusion 
Knowledge is one of the key resources for nearly all modern industries. To create new knowl-
edge, it is necessary for people to work together and transfer their knowledge. In the actual 
discussion about knowledge transfer, we identify two shortcomings: 
1. If knowledge is a power resource, knowledge transfer is subject to the free rider prob-
lem. Most studies focus on structural constraints to overcome the free rider problem. 
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Only a few address cultural and cognitive constraints, and virtually no study integrates 
these different approaches. To understand and describe the different requirements for 
knowledge transfer we link the structural, cultural and cognitive perspectives together. 
2. While most theoretical literature stresses the transfer aspect of knowledge transfer (i.e. 
requires a sender and a receiver), empirical studies concentrate on the providing of in-
formation. In our view, not only sharing knowledge and probably losing power in this 
process is a problem, but rather the act of learning, of obtaining knowledge is also 
problematic. Since transferring knowledge consists not only of giving information, but 
also receiving information, both sides of the transfer process have to be observed. We 
examine the obtaining of knowledge with the same theoretical perspective as provid-
ing knowledge. Our study is therefore the first empirical test of a comprehensive view 
which links knowledge management and organizational learning.  
To test our assumptions we conducted a survey in 11 German hospitals, distinguishing be-
tween doctors and nursing staff. These two groups are different in the level of the knowledge 
intensity in their work and in their hierarchical status. 
The main results of the survey support our hypothesises. All perspectives contribute to under-
standing how the free rider problem can be overcome: For doctors, structural, cultural, and 
cognitive constraints together help to transfer knowledge, i.e. providing and obtaining knowl-
edge. For nurses, our findings show that the different perspectives complement each other. 
While the structural and cognitive constraints support providing knowledge, the cultural con-
straints instigate obtaining knowledge. 
The results lead to recommendations for action for both groups, doctors and nursing staff. 
Both groups need leeway for interaction, access to computer-mediated possibilities of knowl-
edge transfer, they must be intrinsically motivated, and they need a strong team culture. Nev-
ertheless, the survey shows that only intradisciplinary team culture has a significant effect. 
Due to the hierarchical structure of German hospitals, interdisciplinary team culture has no 
significant influence. In the future, knowledge transfer between both groups will become 
more important, therefore hospital management must support the interdisciplinary transfer. 
The differentiation of doctors and nurses shows that knowledge transfer follows different 
rules for different level of knowledge intense processes. On a high level of knowledge inten-
sity a combined perspective of already formulated hypothesises can explain knowledge trans-
fer quite well. At a medium level those theories do not fit as well. Results from our survey 
show that these level differences are likely due to different mechanics of knowledge transfer 
at those different levels of the knowledge intensity of working processes. More research needs 
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to be done to explain knowledge transfer in a medium knowledge intense work environment, 
since most theories implicitly deal with high level knowledge intense work environment. 
Our survey is not only a contribution to the knowledge management discourse but also to the 
debate about organizational learning (Argyris and Schön 1987; Hedberg 1981). Learning in 
organizations contains fewer factors than providing knowledge. People with a higher occupa-
tional duration learn less than newcomers. The most important factors for learning in organi-
zation are organizational culture (intradisciplinary team culture for the nursing staff and con-
sistency for the doctors) and informal breaks. We can deduce from these findings that organ-
izational learning is less manageable than knowledge management, because it depends more 
on soft factors which are only indirect controllable.  
To sum up, knowledge management and organizational learning depend on “second level 
management”, i.e. management can only provide opportunities where people can provide or 
obtain knowledge. Management can create constraints that support knowledge transfer, but 
employees or members of organizations have to act by themselves. Therefore managers have 
to treat them as the most valuable assets the organization has. Organizational culture and in-
trinsic motivation are vulnerable factors. It is easier to undermine them than to build them up. 
Redundancies, for example, will destroy these soft factors. No manager can lay off employees 
on the one hand, and expect that they transfer their knowledge on the other hand. 
The survey includes only the situation in German hospitals. To see if our findings can be gen-
eralized it is necessary to do additional research. Other countries with different organizational 
structures and cultures must be included before a general theory of knowledge transfer can be 
written. 
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X. Appendix 
main component analysis with varimax-rotation 
knowledge transfer 
  factor 1 factor 2 alpha 
I show colleagues special procedures so that they can learn them. 0.868 0.073 
I support colleagues to gain work experience. 0.834 0.111 
Colleagues learn a lot by watching me on the job. 0.817 0.130 
'providing know-
ledge’ 0.860 
I learn a lot by observing colleagues doing their job. 0.089 0.797 
I turn to colleagues for advice regarding special procedures so that I learn 
th
0.100 0.779 
Colleagues support my efforts to gain work experience. 0.127 0.739 
I learn a lot by asking colleagues. 0.007 0.714 
'obtaining know-
ledge' 0.775 
teamculture 
  factor 1 factor 2 alpha 
Most employees in this hospital are highly involved in their work. 0.722 0.200 
Everyone in this hospital believes that s/he can have a positive impact. 
0.694 0.248 
Decisions in this hospital are usually made at the level where the best in-
formation is available. 0.655 0.315 
This hospital delegates authority so that people can act on their own. 0.586 0.268 
Teams of my occupational group (doctors among themselves / nursing staff 
among themselves) are the primary building blocks of this hospital.  0.561 -0.288 
This hospital relies on horizontal control and coordination to get work 
done, rather than hierarchy. 0.379 0.350 
'intradisciplinary 
teamculture' 0.724
Interdisciplinary teams of (doctors and nursing stuff) are the primary build-
ing blocks of this hospital. 0.127 0.791 
Cooperation and collaboration across functional roles (nursing stuff <-> 
doctors) are actively encouraged in this hospital. 0.118 0.693 
Working in this ward is like being part of a team. 0.438 0.606 
'interdisciplinary 
teamculture' 0.708
       
    
Items for consistency (alpha=0.83)       
It is easy to coordinate projects across functional units in this organization. 
      
There is a good alignment of goals across levels of this organization.       
This organization has a ‘strong’ culture. It is easy for us to reach consen-
sus, even on difficult issues.       
People from different organizational units still share a common perspec-
tive.       
When disagreements occur, we work hard to achieve ‘win-win’ solutions. 
      
The managers in this hospital ‘practice what they preach’.       
There is a clear and consistent set of values in this hospital that governs the 
way we do business.        
This organization has an ethical code that guides our behavior and tells us 
right from wrong.        
There is a clear agreement about the right way and the wrong way to do 
things in this organization.       
Our approach to doing business is very consistent and predictable.       
We seldom have trouble reaching agreement on key issues.       
Ignoring the core values of this hospital will get you in trouble.        
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Working with someone from another part of this organization is not like 
working with someone from a different company.        
        
Items for intrinsic motivation (alpha=0.6)       
I’m proud about doing a good job       
I feel comfortable if I’m doing a good job.       
I feel sad and unlucky if I realize that I didn’t work well.       
My job is joyful.       
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